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Abstract 
 
This article analyses the first peace talks to take place against the backdrop of 
an International Criminal Court investigation: the Juba Talks between the 
Lord’s Resistance Army and the Government of Uganda (2006-8). Drawing 
on field research and original source material, it departs from well-worn peace 
versus justice debates and provides new empirical material to explore how the 
presence of the court shaped domestic political dynamics at Juba. It argues 
that at the level of broad rhetoric, the presence of the court created significant 
discord between negotiating parties. On a practical level, however, it created 
space for consensus, but not the type envisaged by international justice 
promoters. The court came to be seen by both sides as an intervention that 
needed to be contained and controlled. This resulted in the politically 
expedient Agreement on Accountability and Reconciliation, which showcased 
a transitional justice ‘tool-kit’, but was based on a shared desire to evade the 
jurisdiction of international criminal justice. Given its practical complexity, 
the transitional justice agreement was ultimately rejected by Joseph Kony, 
who became increasingly distrustful of his own negotiating team at Juba. In 
findings relevant to other contexts, the article presents in-depth analyses of 
how domestic political dynamics around the ICC intervention produced a 
national transitional justice framework designed to protect both parties from 
war crimes accountability.  
 
Keywords: Uganda, International Criminal Court, transitional justice, Lord’s 
Resistance Army.  
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Introduction 
 
On 6 December 2016, Dominic Ongwen, a senior commander in Uganda’s 
notorious rebel group, the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) entered court room 3 at the 
International Criminal Court (ICC) in The Hague to sit through the first day of his 
trial. After a long “judicial stalemate”1, the Ongwen case has re-sparked interest in the 
court’s first ever investigation, underscoring the fact that a large part of the ICC story 
in northern Uganda remains untold. While there is a significant literature on the 
power politics of international justice in Uganda
2
; the theoretical peace versus justice 
debate in that context
3
; the domestic legal implications of the ICC investigation
4
; and 
local perceptions and experiences of the court,
5
 there is a lack of historicized, 
empirical analysis exploring how negotiating parties constructed the national 
transitional justice framework developed during the Juba Peace Talks between the 
Government of Uganda and the LRA/M (Movement).
6
 These were the first peace 
talks ever to take place against the backdrop of charges brought by the ICC against 
key members of one of the negotiating sides. As Clark and Kersten note separately, 
the “empirical picture remains murky” and the domestic politics of ICC interventions 
during peace negotiations, despite a “rich array of theories”, remains underexplored.7  
 
In 2006, when the Juba talks began, the ongoing conflict in northern Uganda 
was at the heart of debates about ‘peace versus justice’. The GoU referred ‘the 
situation of the Lord’s Resistance Army’ to the Court in 2003 and arrest warrants for 
the LRA’s five top commanders were unsealed in 2005. While some argued the 
warrants would marginalize the LRA and pressurise them to join talks, others 
believed the warrants closed down incentives for Joseph Kony and the high command 
to engage confidently in the process.
8
 One scholar likened these “either/or” polemics 
to a competitive sports rivalry in which one felt they had to choose “sides”.9  Further, 
many northern Ugandans, particularly the Acholi, who had suffered at the hands of 
both the LRA and the national army, the Ugandan People’s Defence Force (UPDF), 
were angry that only one side was being held to account. As it became clear the ICC 
would not withdraw its warrants, it came to be seen as the ultimate peace spoiler. It 
was roundly critiqued for holding millions of northern Ugandan’s hostage to ‘foreign’ 
 4 
concepts of retributive justice, incompatible with ‘traditional’ Acholi values of 
reconciliation and forgiveness.
10
  
 
While debate was hyperactive during the talks, it petered out when they 
collapsed, in December 2008.
11
 This is surprising because the Juba process left an 
important transitional transitional justice legacy, an Agreement on Accountability and 
Reconciliation (AAR), signed by the GoU and the LRA/M in June 2007, and an 
implementing protocol signed in February 2008. These agreements proposed a 
national transitional justice framework for dealing with both LRA and UPDF war 
crimes, including a special international crimes division of the Ugandan High Court; 
support for traditional justice; a “body” to “inquire into the past”; and reparations for 
victims.
12
 The GoU later committed itself to implementing the AAR framework 
regardless of the eventual failure of the talks.  
 
Some argued the signing of the accords proved peace and justice could be 
negotiated simultaneously during peace talks. Others insisted the accords failed to 
overcome the fundamental impasse of the ICC arrest warrants. Both interpretations 
brought the ‘peace versus justice’ dilemma into sharp focus, while the broader 
domestic political context informing the AAR accords, including structural power 
dynamics between the GoU and LRA, historical understandings of conflict, and 
internal dynamics of the negotiating parties, were obscured. As the ICC’s first 
Uganda trial takes place there is scholarly consensus that debates about ‘peace versus 
justice’ in the northern Ugandan context are essentially “moot”.13 Northern Uganda 
has experienced: “its longest period of stability in decades…without a successful 
conclusion to peace negotiations and without criminal accountability for the LRA’s 
top commanders”.14 This article therefore departs from debates about peace versus 
justice per se, and instead analyses the interplay between the ICC and domestic 
politics that shaped the construction of the AAR accords at Juba.  
 
In essence, the article argues that the role of the ICC warrants at Juba shaped 
political dynamics between negotiating parties in two key, sometimes contradictory 
ways. In broad-brush rhetoric, the warrants became a naturalized part of the power 
structures and war histories into which they were subsumed. This created severe 
discord between negotiating parties, entrenching power inequalities and reinforcing 
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political narratives that pre-existed the presence of the court. On the specific issue of 
accountability for war crimes however, both parties came to see the court as a 
perplexing intervention that needed to be contained. This allowed for a perverse form 
of short-term cooperation between GoU and LRA/M delegations, and shaped the 
politically expedient AAR accords, best characterized as a fragile “mafia type 
truce”. 15  While they superficially showcased the transitional justice ‘toolkit’, the 
agreements were not rooted in engagement with its normative axioms. The 
overarching purpose of the accords was not justice but rather the codification of a 
strategy to obstruct and evade jurisdiction of the ICC. This fragile consensus on war 
crimes accountability ultimately broke down because it was based on short-term 
political tactics rather than any enduring, high-level agreement about the how justice 
might be achieved in northern Uganda.  
 
Findings are drawn from 14 months of fieldwork in Uganda between 2012-16. 
During this period, over 100 semi-structured interviews were conducted with GoU 
actors involved in the talks; LRA/M negotiators; mediation team advisors; donor staff 
members and civil society representatives. The article also draws upon newspaper 
reports and unpublished documentary evidence from the talks themselves.  
Getting to Juba  
 
In 2006, Mareike Schomerus interviewed Kony and asked him to explain the 
background to the conflict: “Let me say it”, he replied, “Museveni he did not want 
Acholi to be in their land… He want Acholi to be out, to complete, to die all”.16 
Museveni’s National Resistance Army/Movement (NRM/A) seized power in 1986 
after a five-year guerilla war against Milton Obote. The Acholi were well represented 
in Obote’s army and two Acholi generals led a successful coup just prior to 
Museveni’s victory. Because the NRA/M regarded the Acholi as a threat, they were 
systematically oppressed. The NRA did not discriminate: they killed fleeing troops 
and former politicians but also went “deep into the rural areas to harass, loot and kill 
ordinary people”.17 
 
The severity of the NRA attack on the north gave rise to an enduring, 
seemingly preternatural form of armed resistance led by Joseph Kony. There was a 
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general lack of popular support amongst fellow Acholis and it is estimated that around 
66,000 people were abducted by the LRA in northern Uganda, four fifths of whom 
were under the age of eighteen.
18
 By 1996, the GoU began forcing people into camps, 
and within a decade more than 90% of the Acholi population had been displaced. 
While they were ostensibly ‘protected’ by groups of UPDF soldiers, attacks on camps 
were common, and abuses by both the UPDF and LRA were a regular occurrence.
19
  
 
There have been several attempts at peace but Museveni’s default approach 
has been impatience with negotiations and determination to keep fighting. The war 
provided strong basis for appeals to donors for increased defence spending and it 
allowed the GoU to ignore legitimate Acholi grievances, equating them with support 
for the LRA.
20
 The period after the 1996 elections in Uganda witnessed a successful 
Acholi civil society campaign to implement a blanket amnesty law to encourage an 
end to fighting. Despite parliamentary endorsement, Museveni preferred the idea of a 
limited amnesty for the “misled,” and rejected the possibility of pardons for “bandits 
like Kony and his deputy Otti”.21 In May 1999 he changed his position to win popular 
support in the north on an upcoming constitutional referendum and the Amnesty Act 
was signed in 2000.
22
  
 
In 2002, the UPDF launched a major offensive – Operation Iron Fist - against 
the LRA. The group was now mainly operating from South Sudan with the support of 
the Sudanese Government (GoS), who used them as a proxy force in its military 
campaign against the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA). Jan Egeland, the UN 
Humanitarian Coordinator, visited northern Uganda in November 2003 and delivered 
his oft-quoted summation that this was “the biggest forgotten, neglected humanitarian 
emergency in the world today”. A second Iron Fist offensive took place in 2004 and 
was more effective in its direct targeting of LRA leadership. Despite the active ICC 
investigation, the GoU declared a ceasefire in November 2004 in the hope that Kony 
and key commanders would surrender and accept an amnesty. According to Pax 
Christi Netherlands – an NGO engaged in the peace effort since the 1990s - the ICC 
warrants torpedoed government efforts.
23
  This was frustrating for Museveni because 
various factors were now coalescing to make conflict resolution a high-stakes political 
issue, most notably: donor impatience, the first multi-party national elections under 
the NRM scheduled for 2006, and the hosting of the Commonwealth Heads of 
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Government Summit the following year.
24
 By the mid-2000s things were closing in 
on the LRA too. In January 2005 the SPLA/M signed a Comprehensive Peace 
Agreement (CPA) with GoS, marking an end to the long-running north-south civil 
war. Soon after, John Garang, first President of semi-autonomous South Sudan 
(GoSS) was killed in a helicopter crash returning from a meeting with long-standing 
ally Museveni. Garang was replaced by his deputy Salva Kiir, and Riek Machar was 
appointed vice-president. Neither Kiir nor Machar had a close personal association 
with Museveni and this new dynamic in bi-lateral relations created a promising 
avenue through which to explore peace talks.  
 
In February 2006 a small delegation of LRA/M and Pax Christi 
representatives travelled to Juba to meet Machar.
25
 A “formal accord” was structured 
around three central points: GoSS would facilitate peace negotiations; the LRA would 
end all military activity in South Sudan and, if the LRA reneged on these provisions, 
they would be expelled from South Sudan.
26
 In May, Machar travelled to remote 
Nabanaga on the Sudan-DRC border to meet Kony in person.
 
The encounter was 
filmed and later broadcast by Reuters.
 27
 Kony looked “less relaxed” than his deputy, 
Vincent Otti, who had done a lot of the groundwork with Machar leading up to the 
meeting.
28
 At this point the GoU was outwardly sceptical: “You can’t trust Kony,” 
insisted a UPDF spokesperson, “he always makes these moves when he is 
desperate… we will continue to hunt him”.29  Nevertheless, in July 2006 the GoU sent 
a delegation to Juba, where the LRA/M team had been waiting since early June.
30
  On 
14 July, the two sides sat down with the mediation team: the talks had officially 
commenced. Months later, in October, a UN managed “Juba Initiative Fund”, was set 
up to co-ordinate and channel “basic” support from donors.31 With the ICC Chief 
Prosecutor publicly trumpeting that the “best way to finally stop the conflict…is to 
arrest the top leaders”, the trust fund donors (all States parties to the court) were clear 
they would only tolerate an agreement that addressed the accountability issue.
32
  With 
donor money also came pressure to ensure that agreements were drawn up and 
concluded quickly and decisively: the talks, said one analyst, were placed on “a short 
leash”. 33  
 
Approaches at Juba: internal incoherence, different ‘peaces’ and mistrust 
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At the outset, the talks were hastily organized around five agenda items, with 
“justice and accountability” placed third on the list. Between July 2006 when the talks 
began, and December 2008 when Operation Lightening Thunder
34
 was launched 
against the LRA, the Juba process was characterized by “a pattern of sputtering 
progress punctuated by frequent delays”.35 Three dynamics shaped the process from 
the outset. Firstly, both delegations lacked internal coherence; secondly, the GoU and 
the LRA/M had different visions of the kind of ‘peace’ they were trying to achieve; 
and thirdly, there was profound distrust between both sides.  
 
Lack of coherence within negotiating teams 
When the talks began there were a range of positions on the GoU side, 
reflected in the composition of the delegation. The head of the team, Minister of 
Internal Affairs, Dr Ruhakana Ruganda, was believed to be committed to negotiated 
settlement and supported an “expedited process with clear direction that addressed 
domestic political considerations, such as public opinion in the north”. 36  But 
alongside him sat Colonel Charles Otema, commander of the UPDF 4
th
 Division. 
Otema, personally, and the military he represented, were intent on what one UPDF 
official called the “icing of an LRA surrender”.37  The priority remained military 
victory rather than a negotiated settlement.   
 
Before the talks began Machar tried to convince Kony’s deputy, Otti, to head 
the delegation, but he refused, citing uncertainty relating to the ICC warrants.
38
 The 
delegation Kony sent to Juba had “weak” and “tenuous” links with the high 
command, and was made up primarily of members of the Acholi diaspora.
39
  Father 
Carlos Rodriguez, a respected Spanish priest who lived and worked in Acholiland for 
years, said presciently in early July:  
“I doubt the 16-member negotiating team Kony has named has any power to 
negotiate anything on behalf of the LRA, because these are ordinary people 
that have not been in the bush with the LRA”.40   
 
In contrast to the “often amateurish demeanor” of the LRA/M, the GoU had a high-
level delegation with far greater technical capacity but both sides shared a major 
structural weakness: the political wing was subordinated to the military high 
command, headed, respectively, by Museveni and Kony, neither of whom were 
present at the talks.
41
 Martin Ojul, first Chair of the LRA/M delegation, gave 
 9 
expression to this difficult situation: “no matter which side one belongs to, the real 
decision makers are not in Juba”.42  
 
Different peaces 
Both sides had an interest in ending the war but arrived in Juba wanting 
different types of peace.
43
 Until the last moment, the GoU relayed mixed messages 
about its willingness to engage in negotiations. From mid-June 2006 the government 
refused to offer Kony amnesty or to send a delegation to Juba.
44
 In early July both 
positions were reversed.
45
 Some observers interpreted this as tactical rather than 
chaotic, allowing the GoU to take control of the situation at Juba and insist on a 
“speedy, expeditious” set of talks, framed as a generous way of offering the LRA an 
“exit”.46 Two months into the process, Museveni expressed impatience with having to 
address anything beyond a straightforward end to the fighting:  
“Advise them to come out of the bush and stop talking about irrelevant things 
in Juba… We have elected leaders who can talk about rehabilitation but not 
them (LRA) who have been stopping development. This is childish”.47   
 
The President and more hawkish members of his administration, wanted what 
Galtung describes as “negative peace”: a mere absence of war in the north.48 Even 
Ruganda recalled reluctance to negotiate broader socio-economic and political issues 
with the LRA/M:  
“it was not just the President and State house that was uncomfortable. I was 
uncomfortable. Kony and his people had no right to talk about these issues. 
They had no mandate”.49   
 
The LRA/M delegations’ public statements, on the other hand, emphasized the 
potential of Juba to cement a more “positive peace”, a new political and social 
settlement “not limited to the idea of getting rid of something”, rather, involving “the 
idea of establishing something that is missing”. 50  This included “comprehensive 
solutions” to address the underlying causes of the conflict. Throughout the talks, 
however, it was not clear whether addressing underlying causes of conflict meant 
providing money, status and protection to senior LRA/M figures, or whether emphasis 
was on producing a more substantial peace settlement for northern Uganda: these two 
motivations largely coexisted and were seen, to varying degrees, as mutually 
supportive in the LRA/M. A related point is that accusations of individual delegates 
pursuing their own interests and/or being co-opted by the NRM were a continuous 
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feature of the talks. As Schomerus argues this narrative actually served a ‘distinct 
purpose’ for the LRA/M: it was the ‘glue’ that held the broader system together.51 It 
bolstered the perception of the LRA/M as a marginalized group, subject to the 
vicissitudes of ‘hostile’ GoU structures that conspired to make internal unity 
unobtainable. If a consistent negotiating position was structurally impossible then 
how could peace ever be achieved? This kind of logic created a politics of grievance 
amongst the LRA/M which would be used as an excuse to avoid serious reflection 
about their own ‘role in the failure of the talks’.52 
 
Lack of trust between negotiating sides 
A profound lack of trust between the parties, rooted in the history of conflict, 
shaped the dynamic at Juba.  There was a strong assumption within GoU ranks that 
Kony did not really ‘want’ peace. This is now a dominant post-Juba political 
narrative, designed to absolve the GoU from any role in the failure of the talks. 
During Juba it was the central justification for the government position on the need 
for negotiation deadlines and military preparedness. While there were important 
figures within government who had a more sympathetic view of Kony’s intentions - 
Rugunda, for example, argued that Kony “was looking for an opportunity where he 
could be rehabilitated but he was not sure about some of the issues, especially the 
ICC”– in general, the hawks had the President’s ear throughout the process.53    
 
In October 2006, three weeks after the LRA failed, under the terms of a 
Cessation of Hostilities Agreement, to assemble at Owiny-Kibul in southern Sudan, 
military chiefs briefed the President that: “based on available intelligence the LRA is 
preparing for war…most likely the talks will not succeed; high chance of return to 
war”.54 LRA/M representatives insisted failure to assemble was due to unauthorized 
UPDF troop movement near the area.
55
 But just three months into the talks, the 
dominant GoU position was informed by military intelligence alleging the LRA was 
purchasing military and communication equipment, retrieving arms and ammunition 
and training new radio operators in DRC bases.
56
 Stephen Kagoda, Permanent 
Secretary to the Ministry of Internal Affairs and a member of the GoU delegation 
explained that:  
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“honestly speaking, we went into the talks not expecting anything out of them.  
We did not expect Kony to come out…we knew that whenever Kony was 
under pressure, he would go for peace talks to re-organise”.57  
 
While serious reservations about Kony’s motives existed within government 
and the military, the GoU public position at the talks was carefully choreographed. A 
senior ranking government official explained: “there were people who believed that 
the government was not interested in peace so how do you convince those people we 
are for peace?  To show everybody that we are interested in peace.”58 That, he argued, 
“was one of the major reasons” for agreeing to the process.59 Another recalled a 
private conversation with the President during which she convinced him that 
commitment to the Juba process was a “legacy issue”.60 Museveni’s advisers were 
aware that a government decision to withdraw from the process would be interpreted 
badly by the international community. Donor accusations of corruption, election fraud 
and failure to resolve the conflict in the North were already harming the President’s 
reputation as a solid leader and statesman.
 61
 Security and intelligence briefings given 
to Museveni stressed the need to “prepare for a resumption of 
hostilities…immediately after talks collapse” but also to “keep the Government 
mediation team intact to reassure the international community and population of 
government commitment to talks”.62  
 
When Museveni travelled to Juba in October 2006 and met the LRA/M 
delegation, spokesperson Godfrey Ayoo, claimed the president called them 
“uninformed Ugandans who have been out of the country for twenty years” and said 
things which, “were all abusive – indicating that he is never interested in peace 
talks”.63  Deputy head of the GoU delegation, Henry Okello Oryem, denied this, 
telling journalists that “to the contrary (Mr Museveni) used the opportunity to make it 
very clear that he had come all this way to support and encourage the peace 
process.” 64  In a candid assertion of government strategy, however, a senior 
government official explained that at Juba: “we were pretending!  We knew he 
[Kony] would never sign any stupid peace document!”.65 A mediation team adviser 
agreed. The president, he said, regularly complained that Kony was “fooling us” but 
was advised: “please do not attack, let the talks play out, we know he will not sign, 
then once and for all, the world will know who the spoiler is.  And the President, he 
went to the very end”.66   
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Sowing discord: Understanding ICC narratives at Juba 
 
Barney Afako, chief legal adviser to the mediation team, recalled how the 
parties were “persuaded” to deal with accountability and reconciliation as the third 
agenda item: 
“This placement of the issue allowed for a gentle build-up towards the 
negotiations on justice.  More crucially it ensured criminal justice was located 
in a more appropriate context amongst the political, historical, social and 
economic justice issues that also needed to be addressed”.67 
 
This presupposed there could be an “appropriate context”, agreed upon by all sides, 
when in fact, a shared narrative about the causes and events of war was elusory. The 
power asymmetries, deep distrust, and duplicity guiding the Juba process provided no 
firm foundation upon which justice and accountability agreements might be reached. 
It is against this backdrop that the ICC’s role at Juba should be understood. Certainly, 
the investigation and warrants shaped the debate on justice, and, more specifically, the 
AAR accords, but those debates were, in turn, informed by historical and political 
dynamics far wider and deeper than the controversial presence of the international 
court.    
 
‘The ICC can help us’: GOU approaches 
When the GoU ICC referral was made public in 2004, most observers 
assumed Uganda - a state party - had initiated the move. Over time, the sequence of 
events has been challenged and numerous sources concur the ICC arrived in Uganda, 
“having lobbied for a referral”. 68  Civil society leader, Zachary Lomo recalled a 
meeting with the Chief Prosecutor in New York in 2006: “he was asserting himself” 
and was “clear…that the court had taken the first steps with the Uganda case”.69 The 
Ugandan government was easy to convince because they believed the referral would 
assist military efforts. Kagoda was unequivocal about this: “we thought only a 
military operation would get rid of Kony but our military did not have jurisdiction in 
Sudan. That is why we listened to the ICC: how else do we handle this? The ICC can 
help us.”70  A senior adviser to Museveni concurred:  
“when we briefly talked about transitional justice, we talked about it as an 
extension of military strategy; at first, we wanted the ICC but then it became 
clear that Kony might accept traditional mechanisms; after all, he is a weird 
guy, he changes his mind, so we needed the ICC to be flexible.”71 
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This highlighted a serious lack of knowledge about the statute and jurisdiction of the 
court. Government ministers and military officials had “no idea” what they had signed 
up to and, according to a senior UPDF official, “did not understand the impact of 
referral and did not think about an exit strategy”.72  
 
At first it was presumed that the ICC would be flexible, and government 
officials casually undermined its jurisdiction when it proved politically expedient. 
Rugunda, for example, referred to the court as a “tool” the government was using.73  
In the run-up to the beginning of the talks, Museveni made public statements to the 
effect that the warrants could be withdrawn. Again, he offered Kony amnesty, 
conditional on whether he “responds positively” to the process and “abandons 
terrorism”.74 Museveni, at this stage, was frustrated the warrants had not resulted in a 
regional military effort to “hunt” Kony.  Conflating the powers and functions of the 
UN and the ICC, he complained: “the UN system has no moral authority now to 
demand for Kony’s trial after failing to arrest him for the nine months he has been in 
Congo.”75 
 
In September 2006, Rugunda told reporters that the traditional Acholi 
reconciliation process, mato oput could provide the solution to the ICC impasse:  
“the ICC supports the Juba talks and they would like to see an end to the 
conflict. The ICC also wants justice done and is opposed to impunity.  In the 
mato oput system, we hope to have a win-win situation”.76  
 
But this was misleading. The ICC never expressed public support for the Juba 
process, and prior to Rugunda’s statement the OTP requested the Registrar submit a 
report on progress made in the execution of the arrest warrants, and co-operation of 
relevant states.  The ICC OTP: “stressed that the arrest of Kony and his deputies was 
vital for their effective prosecution and prevention of further crimes”.77    
 
‘It might be a trap’: LRA ICC narratives 
In September 2006, Vincent Otti said he would sign a peace deal but only if 
the ICC arrest warrants were lifted, “without that”, he said, “not even a single LRA 
soldier will go home…because it might be a trap”.78 Museveni responded via radio 
announcement that a peace deal must be signed first:  
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“the removal of the indictments will be a reward for their signing of the 
agreement.  Otherwise you (rebels) will die on our hands or the hands of the 
ICC.”79  
 
This was “the impasse”, widely reported in the press, and antagonistically raised on 
both sides. But a closer interrogation of LRA/M narratives reveal a more nuanced 
attitude towards the court, formed of three main perspectives.  
 
Firstly, similar to the GoU, there was a lack of understanding about the legal 
basis, jurisdiction and powers of the ICC. Kony, for example, referred to the ICC and 
the International Court of Justice interchangeably; LRA/M spokesperson Olweny, 
talked about the ICC as “part of the UN system that favours the strong”80; and both 
Kony and Otti assumed the court had the death penalty.
 
 Secondly, there was 
receptiveness to the idea of a court as a forum for political expression, narrative 
shaping, and testimony. Despite abjuration of the warrants, the LRA/M wanted to 
engage with the court because it might allow them to tell their side of the story. In 
January 2007, Otti told reporters:  
“We were indicted without being questioned.  We were not even investigated.  
That is why we decided to at least first of all send some of our delegates … to 
the Hague and … the court prosecutor to explain to them or we would like the 
prosecutor to send his staff to come here and hear from us whether we have 
really committed crimes”.81  
 
Thirdly, while the concept of legal neutrality existed as a theoretical 
possibility in the minds of the LRA/M, it could not be realized in their political 
context. While accepting the idea of a court process, per se, they concluded the ICC 
could not be a neutral arbiter. The court’s perceived closeness to Museveni and 
decision not to investigate UPDF crimes would prevent an impartial historical record 
of events or a fair allocation of guilt and punishment. In June 2006, Schomerus asked 
Kony whether he had seen the warrants and his reply portrayed the complexity of 
LRA/M attitudes towards the ICC: 
“We did not see any…but…as I am seeing you cannot hear the word from one 
side only…it is better if those people (the ICC), they hear, they come and talk 
to me as you are now talking (…) then they hear what I am saying and what 
Museveni is saying…They did not question me, they did not ask me, they did 
not interview me about the ICC”.82 
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The unequal political dynamics that shaped accountability decisions were 
deeply troubling to the LRA/M, and informed a position more complex than a 
straightforward desire to evade accountability. Indeed, the LRA/M also refused to 
accept the principle of the blanket amnesty, arguing that it was part of a GoU “ploy to 
indiscriminately criminalize all members of the LRA/M and hide its own role in the 
conflict under the carpet”.83  
 
Important differences therefore divided negotiating parties on the ICC. The 
GoU initially saw the court as a military tool and later became frustrated by its 
combined ineffectiveness and rigidity. The warrants were still, however, a valuable 
bargaining chip that might deliver a decisive surrender of the LRA leadership. The 
LRA/M’s position was arguably more substantive and nuanced: it saw in the law both 
an expansive opportunity and a perilous threat. Could the presence of an international 
court provide the discursive space the LRA/M craved, or was the ICC just another 
inscrutable and hostile power structure poised to come crashing down on them?  For 
the GoU, debates around the ICC were at times frustrating, but it was always able to 
maintain control over the political stakes of the justice issue.  For the LRA/M, the 
ICC issue was existential: it was not the idea of accountability and reconciliation per 
se that was so troubling, but the power and knowledge asymmetry between the 
negotiating sides, a replication of the structural dynamics that had led to the conflict 
in the first place, and which was now foreclosing any opportunity for justice to be, in 
the eyes of powerful elements in the LRA/M, ‘fair’.   
 
Catalysing cooperation: the ICC and shaping of the AAR 
It was against this difficult backdrop that the AAR accords were debated and 
drafted. At this stage, in early 2007, the talks had reached a standstill, so Pax Christi 
offered to facilitate a controversial series of “back-channel” meetings in Mombasa, 
more “conducive to mutual understanding than the prickly climate of Juba”. 84 
Museveni put his half-brother General Salim Saleh in charge of the GoU four-person 
team. On the LRA/M side Otti sanctioned the meetings and team consisted of five 
people, including Ojul and LRA/M legal adviser Ayena Odongo.
85
  Specific 
discussions on the justice and accountability agenda item had yet to be negotiated 
formally at Juba but were, according to civil society leader, Michael Otim, regularly 
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the subject of “tit for tat” and “attritional” exchanges.86 Quite remarkably then, not 
long after the Mombasa meeting began, Pax Christi announced accountability and 
reconciliation issues had been resolved with a “refreshingly straightforward text” that 
recognized “traditional and alternative justice mechanisms as key elements in dealing 
with accountability for the offences committed during the war”.87 Rugunda explained 
the implications for the ICC warrants: “our position on the court indictments is that 
the government will engage the ICC after a final peace agreement (is reached) and 
after the LRA have undergone the traditional system of mato oput”.88  
 
Back in Juba things were less straightforward. The talks officially re-started 
on 1 June 2007, by which point both “international influence” and mediation team 
legal advisers were “instrumental in producing a fuller understanding of the need for 
robust accountability mechanisms”.89 The International Center for Transitional Justice 
organized a seminar to encourage parties towards a “technical understanding” of the 
available accountability options, given the existence of the ICC warrants.
90
  This must 
have had some impact because GoU negotiators soon distanced themselves from the 
Mombasa text and assured US embassy staff they had: “a new approach on the issues 
of justice and accountability, which will focus on teaching LRA leaders about their 
judicial options, rather than focus on traditional reconciliation mechanisms”.91   
 
During this period, recalled Otim, “points of synergy” developed between the 
sides. Once it became clear the Mombasa approach would not suffice, the 
overwhelming priority for both delegations was to agree on a national legal solution 
that would satisfy ICC standards so that talks could progress.
92
 On the LRA/M side 
the priority was to reach a deal that would reassure Kony he would not face 
international prosecution. On the NRM side there was a compatible logic at play: 
senior government elites wanted to marginalize the ICC and re-assert national 
political and legal jurisdiction over the issue of crimes committed during the conflict 
in northern Uganda. The mediations’ legal advisers took a hard-boiled and expedient 
approach. The general position, said one, “was that nobody wants justice, justice is 
coercive, it is inconvenient, you have to protect people from justice”.93 Interestingly, 
Afako later noted that: 
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“if you go back to the text of Juba, you will hardly find the word justice… we 
never used the term transitional justice, we simply described the kinds of 
things we could do practically”.94    
 
On 13 June, the parties reached a consensus on a set of “general principles” on 
justice and accountability, which prioritized a national legal and institutional 
framework for war crimes accountability.
95
  Pax Christi noted wistfully, that the text 
agreed in Mombasa appeared “roughly hewn in contrast to the legal finesse of its Juba 
counterpart” but the AAR itself was drafted on the back of an envelope during a 
Eurostar journey between Paris and London.
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 The final version was polished back in 
Juba with relative speed and ease, with “not many people in the negotiating room”.97 
At one point UN officials requested a greater role in AAR discussions, but the 
mediation team refused. This was not a deliberative process; it was pragmatic, shaped 
by a diversionary logic that acknowledged the structural and symbolic power of 
international criminal justice, but also needed to find ways to contain and circumvent 
it. Regardless of the absolutely central role commentators gave to the ‘peace versus 
justice’ dilemma at Juba, mediation team advisers recalled that AAR discussions: 
“were not serious, they were not what torpedoed the talks…the AAR was signed in a 
record time of one month and it moved much faster than other Agenda items”.98    
 
The LRA/M was reportedly unhappy that not all of the 20 issues it had 
recommended for discussion under the agenda item had been addressed, but did not 
push it and on 29 June 2007 both parties signed the AAR. It was made broad and 
shallow and provided the parties with plenty of room for maneuver. The agreement 
proposed almost the full set of transitional justice mechanisms and while it nodded 
towards principled compliance with international and transitional justice it was based 
on narrow political interests. The inventory approach was later ridiculed by Afako, 
who recalled people wandering around asking: “so, what is this vetting thing?  Shall 
we have that too?”99  Rugunda meanwhile admitted that: “on the AAR, we did not 
restrict ourselves…We might not use everything that is in the AAR, but that is our 
political framework”. 100  The government was relaxed about an agreement it was 
confident it could control. Nobody really expected to see UPDF prosecutions in the 
new court and senior civil servants tasked with exploring the feasibility of a truth 
commission and reparations complained that Uganda was now a “laboratory for 
external ideas about transitional justice” that were doomed to fail in that context.101 In 
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the absence of a political transition, transitional justice processes would naturally 
become an extension of politics by other means.  
 
For a short period, the AAR worked in the LRA/M delegation’s favour too. In 
a position paper delivered just prior to the drafting of the accords, Ojul was candid 
about “the embarrassing situation” the parties found themselves in with regards the 
accountability issue at Juba.
102
 He valorized the LRA/M preference for ‘traditional’ 
justice (included in the AAR), linking it with notions of Acholi identity and 
exceptionalism but framing this in the language of international criminal justice. 
“Acholi” processes, he argued, were potentially replicable: an exportable solution to 
tensions between peace and justice. Anything agreed at Juba, Ojul suggested, might 
be path-breaking, particularly if a new approach to the relationship between 
international and traditional methods of conflict justice could be developed: “We are 
laden”, he pronounced, “with the task of setting up an international legal 
precedent”.103  
 
For both parties, the AAR accords were a set of reactive agreements, drafted 
and signed in order to deflect the ICC rather than to create a substantive, or 
sustainable new justice framework to deal with war crimes. The AAR was in essence, 
a well-crafted and politically chicane decoy: a box ticked to diffuse the actual and 
symbolic grip of the ICC and to allow the talks to continue. Yet the normative power 
of transitional justice at the international level was such that the AAR accords were 
potentially reputation enhancing for both sides.  
 
The shallow roots of accountability promises at Juba 
 
As stipulated in the AAR, the Juba talks were put on hold from late August to late 
September 2007 to allow for donor funded popular consultations on justice and 
accountability. A meeting of legal experts, politicians and civil society also took place 
in Kampala. Both processes were to inform an implementing protocol to the AAR. As 
the government’s popular consultations proceeded, US Secretary of State Jendayi 
Frazer met Museveni, who described Juba as a “circus” characterized by “foolery”.104 
Three days later he and Congolese President Kabila signed an agreement in Tanzania 
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establishing a 90-day timetable after which Congolese armed forces would take action 
against the LRA in Garamba National Park.  
 
The LRA/M’s popular consultations eventually began in Gulu in November 
but were dominated by uncertainty about the death of Vincent Otti, thought by many 
to be the LRA’s “force behind the peace talks”. 105  African observers who travelled 
with the LRA/M delegation reported the team had “virtually no way of 
communicating with Kony.”106 In January 2008 they travelled to the Ri-Kwangba 
assembly area to present findings of the popular consultations but Kony did not show 
up.
107
 Days later, Ojul was dismissed as delegation Chair, purportedly over growing 
links with the NRM and his involvement in the Mombasa meetings.
108
 However, 
despite internal chaos in the LRA/M ranks, the period from the end of January to the 
beginning of March 2008 were, superficially at least, some of the most productive of 
the entire Juba process. Talks resumed on 30 January and the next six weeks 
witnessed developments at breakneck speed.
109
    
 
On 19 February 2008 the parties signed the AAR implementing protocol, 
which included detail on the setting up of “special division of the High Court of 
Uganda…to try individuals who are alleged to have committed serious crimes during 
the conflict”, as well as a truth-telling body, commitment to establishing the 
“necessary arrangements” for reparations and a clearer role for “traditional 
mechanisms” as part of the “alternative justice and reconciliation framework”. The 
Agreement on Implementation and Monitoring Mechanisms, signed ten days later, 
also outlined a commitment by the GoU to approach the UNSC and request the ICC, 
“defer all investigations and prosecutions against the leaders of the LRA”.110  On 23 
February a permanent ceasefire was signed, and a week later LRA/M delegates, now 
headed by James Obita, travelled to Ri-Kwangba to present all agreements to Kony. 
The following day, the final two documents, the agreement on Disarmament 
Demobilisation and Reintegration, and its implementation protocol, were signed by 
the delegations in Juba.  
 
Throughout the talks and particularly after Otti’s death in late 2007, both 
delegations adopted an approach at Juba marked by structural dissociation. Each side 
comprised a group of individuals responsible for day-to-day functioning of the talks 
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(when they were not in hiatus). They entered into negotiations - including those on 
accountability and reconciliation - drew up agreements and signed documents, 
willfully detached, for myriad reasons, from the entirety of their contexts. On the 
GoU side, agenda items, including the AAR, were signed in the knowledge that State 
House was busily preparing a military offensive. On the LRA/M side, the same 
agenda items were signed in the knowledge that Kony, the ultimate guarantor of any 
final peace agreement, was not being adequately consulted and remained concerned 
about several issues, not least the prospect of facing justice. These political realities 
were ‘disassociated’ from deliberations, so agreements were drawn up in bursts and 
progress often seemed notable.  
 
This dissociation became severe in the LRA/M team in 2008 and particularly 
around the issue of war crimes accountability. Any form of justice, whether 
‘traditional’, domestic or international, remained worrying to the LRA high 
command, regardless of what had been formally agreed on their behalf by the LRA/M 
delegation in the AAR. Despite this both parties settled upon 9 April 2008 to sign the 
Final Peace Agreement. One hundred and fifty people, including chief negotiator Riek 
Machar, journalists, UN workers and Acholi elders, assembled in a make-shift camp 
in Nabanga to witness the signing ceremony.
111
 After five days there was no sign of 
Kony. On 18 April, he demanded a meeting with Ugandan leaders to discuss the 
implications of AAR and its annex, and particularly, “why he should face three forms 
of justice: mato oput; Special Division of the High Court; and the International 
Criminal Court”. He had never even heard of mato oput.112 Obita acknowledged that 
Kony’s questions illustrated “his lack of understanding of the agreement”.113 They 
also illustrated his detachment from the Juba process and the speed with which a 
fragile, politically motivated ‘consensus’ on transitional justice might break down or 
create new power dynamics during the talks.  
 
In response to Kony’s request, Rugunda agreed to a meeting of legal experts, 
delegation teams and northern civil society in Kampala in May, to clarify issues 
relating to the AAR. Here, Obita stated the urgent need to: 
“explain to the High Command all of their concerns on issues of 
accountability and reconciliation, and henceforth to reassure them that the 
Agreement in Juba is a good one…the final document should be as simple as 
possible, in layman’s language”.114   
 21 
 
But the AAR and its annex raised a number of highly complex legal issues, 
jettisoning Afako’s hope that “by the end [of the workshop], everyone should be able 
to give an outline of accountability in simple terms”. 115  Nobody could actually 
explain how the AAR accords would work in practice. For the broad northern 
Ugandan constituency at the workshop this was palpably exigent and deeply 
consequential. The Acholi paramount chief pleaded for “simple 
interpretations…which will instill confidence in him (Kony) to sign the 
agreement”.116 In contrast, the GoU was on solid ground and conditions were ripe for 
it grasping both moral ownership and political direction of the transitional justice 
framework. The government’s language was increasingly detached, programmatic, 
and donor-friendly, emphasizing the “mechanisms and procedures” needed to 
implement the AAR accords.
117
 The internal combustion of the LRA/M now seemed 
inevitable and a solid military plan ‘B’ was in place. People in northern Uganda had 
started returning from the camps. The GoU, Oryem explained, would would “go 
ahead and play its role…which would contrast starkly with the LRA’s bad faith”.118   
 
Ayena Odongo, the LRA’s legal adviser for a large part of the process said 
Kony lived in fear of non-acceptance: “he was aware of what he had done and could 
not believe he would be forgiven. The ICC just gave him an excuse”.119  Despite 
LRA/M signatures on both the AAR and its annex, Kony himself was never party to 
decisions or clear about the implications of what was being agreed. At a final meeting 
of northern Ugandan leaders and LRA/M delegates in Garamba at the end of 
November 2008, Kony would eventually accuse his delegation of being “thieves” on 
the NRM payroll and said specifically that he “could not accept the Protocol on 
Accountability and Reconciliation”.120  
 
When the talks completely spun off their axis in December 2008, the GoU 
took the moral high ground and promised to implement the AAR accords, regardless. 
Ten years on, given the domestic political calculations informing the construction of 
the accords it is hardly surprising that, despite donor investment and some cursory 
government engagement on transitional justice, accountability for war crimes in 
northern Uganda has yet to materialize. In the absence of a political transition there 
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was very little impetus amongst entrenched political elites for serious engagement 
with AAR implementation.  
 
Concluding discussion 
 
As Ongwen’s trial takes place at The Hague, we are reminded of the loudest 
debates that took place when the ICC first became involved in Uganda over a decade 
ago. There now exists a scholarly consensus that the role of the ICC at Juba was more 
complex than abstracted peace-versus-justice arguments at the time suggested. This 
article responds to the call for more empirical research focused on the impact of the 
court on domestic political dynamics during peace negotiations. The court played an 
important role in the talks, but mainly in that it “channeled contention” and became a 
symbol against which issues of domestic political concern were mediated and 
articulated: this was particularly significant in the framing of the AAR accords.
121
  
 
As this article has demonstrated, the domestic political dynamics to be 
grappled with at Juba far exceeded the significance of the ICC warrants, yet the 
warrants came to symbolize the intractability of existing power asymmetries in 
Uganda. For the most part, this created severe discord. For the LRA leadership, still in 
the bush, the court represented an overwhelming feeling that any “political 
opportunity structure”122 that may have existed at the beginning of the talks had, 
certainly by the first rejection of the FPA, been closed.  Kony “never believed he 
would be given a fair trial” – but this notion of a fair trial was expansive – it was not 
just linked to legal proceedings in a courtroom but, more broadly, to the potential for 
the LRA high command to get what they wanted out the peace talks.
123
 The court 
came to represent this barrier. An inscrutable international organization, the ICC was 
linked inextricably to the NRM and carried with it an apparent power to shape 
narratives and allocate blame and punishment. It represented, in extreme form, the 
spectre of absolute silencing and total renunciation.   
 
As the article argues, however, during specific discussions on war crimes 
accountability, the presence of the ICC actually created space for fragile domestic 
consensus between delegations at Juba, based on a shared desire to manage the 
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jurisdiction and reach of international criminal justice. The result was the AAR 
accords. The procedural and substantive aspects of the accords masked the highly 
complex dynamics at play at Juba, and represented a simulation of what a set of 
accountability agreements perhaps, might, or should, look like. In reality, they 
comprised a pragmatic and self-interested bargain: a maze of protective possibilities 
and narrative shaping opportunities; and a means (ultimately unsuccessful) by which 
to overcome frustrating constraints imposed by warrants.  Both delegations could 
ultimately agree on the importance of these objectives. For donors and activists, the 
agreements were presented as a game-changing commitment to transitional justice 
during peace talks. Outside of the Juba role-play, though, Museveni was plotting his 
military Plan B and Kony was increasingly distant from his delegation and concerned 
with self-preservation. By the end of 2008, the war was exported to neighboring 
regions of DRC and South Sudan, creating a fragile peace in northern Uganda. There 
is no justice in this peace and this deadlock should be understood as product of the 
political dynamics informing the parties’ approaches to the AAR accords at Juba.  
 
The domestic political dynamics around ICC involvement at Juba has some 
resonance in peace and mediation processes across the region. It is clearly the case 
that in neighboring Kenya, for example, the presence of the ICC has created 
distinctive political approaches, including ‘passive marginalization’ strategies 
designed to ‘circumvent the court by working through other, more readily controllable 
institutions’. 124  Kenya is similar to Uganda in that both countries have adopted 
transitional justice mechanisms, against the backdrop of the ICC but without ‘a 
meaningful political transition having taken place’.125 When the ICC launched an 
investigation in Kenya in 2010, this catalyzed elite domestic cooperation around 
subverting international justice. Mueller, for example, identified a number of ‘tactics’ 
deployed by ICC indictees Uhuru Kenyatta and William Ruto in the run up to the 
Kenyan elections in 2013, in order to ‘undercut the ICC’.126 This included stated 
agreement on the need for broader transitional justice, but despite a raft of measures 
on the table, the government has “dragged its feet and delayed and undermined the 
process as much as it could”.127 
 
As has been demonstrated in the case of Uganda but is also relevant other 
contexts, the presence of the ICC during peace negotiations can create space for 
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opposing sides to come together and develop a programme of “transitional justice as 
subterfuge”. 128  In Uganda, it is impossible to understand the complex dynamics 
around justice for war crimes unless we engage with the domestic political priorities 
that emerged within and between negotiating parties at Juba in response to the ICC 
intervention. A key, enduring ICC legacy in northern Uganda is not justice, nor peace. 
It is something more modest but no less significant: a set of domestic transitional 
justice accords designed to ‘protect’ both government and rebel leaders from ICC 
style accountability. 
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